IceStorm 98 Study

Claude Brett retired from the Metro Toronto Police force (after 17 years) at the rank of Staff Sergeant to take the job of Chief in Gananoque. Claude Brett has been involved in numerous incidents comparable to the Ice Storm, a tornado incident in Western Toronto. He has also done the emergency training program at Arnprior and has managed the break of a gas line on Main Street in Gananoque -- which involved the evacuation of 25% of the town including the old folks' home.

Claude Brett agrees that this event was unusual because the affected area kept on expanding -- "everything outside that area is affecting you also."

Claude Brett says that he got a call on Thursday morning at 4:00am from his office that the ice was forming and that power was starting to flicker. Claude Brett was in the office by 5:15 am. He consulted with his on-duty officer but there were not yet a lot of trees down. He drove around town himself but power was still up in most parts of town -- some parts of town were going off-line. By 7:30 he was consulting with Granite power (the town was down about 20%) but the person at Granite thought they would have the whole town up again by the end of the day. Claude Brett drew the conclusion that things could be contained and corrected and would be short term. As the day progressed (between 0830 -10:00am) trees were starting to fall across intersections and roadways and it was apparent to Claude Brett that the situation was getting progressively worse. Claude Brett contacted the members of the Emergency Control Group (ECG) and set a meeting for 2:00pm.

Claude Brett says that whereas police officers always come to work in an emergency, the members of the ECG do not -- when the weather is bad. So they had to be contacted and informed of the meeting time. Phone lines stayed up until Friday when everything came down. Day two was the worst, according to Claude Brett: he came in at 4:30 Friday morning and by 5:30 - 6:00am the 911 system was down. Claude Brett had to re-deploy his officers, distributing them to strategic corners, and began trying to communicate with the radio stations.

CB's first meeting on Friday morning was a review of the status of the town -- everything was down. Claude Brett understood that when the phone system went down it was possible to go to manual lines (according to Bell Canada) but the system did not contemplate a complete failure. He could not contact his own officers in their. All communications were lost, even his own officers were not able to contact each other. The on-duty dispatcher persisted in dialing zero and somehow managed to contact with an operator in Toronto -- she relayed their situation to Toronto and that operator managed to contact the local radio stations and told them of Gananoque's status. Claude Brett went to the home of a Bell Canada worker (a friend) and requested his assistance whereupon he discovered that Bell's backup system was depleted.

The police station does have a small portable generator but it is not designed to run for days on end. Claude Brett says by day three he was worried that they were going to lose one of their generators because they were running all the time -- so they divided the generators up between the police and fire hall so that they would not both be running all the time. The police station became the command centre on Friday by default -- there was no other place in town with communication facilities and power.

Claude Brett had no difficulty exercising his authority, having already used the emergency plan in Gananoque 3 times and having been trained in emergency response procedures. He observes that it is not widely known (among the political officials) that such a thing as an emergency plan even exists. No one directly challenged his authority at any time during the emergency. Claude Brett commandeered a diesel generator from a tractor trailer for Bell Canada on Friday morning (that was headed to Cornwall) and that person questioned CB's authority. But the driver got the generator back and there were no repercussions.

Money never crossed CB's mind. He would have spent money on supplies and overtime, but it was never a consideration during the emergency.

The meetings were daily (sometimes 3 or 4 per day) and determined by the members of the ECG and the time of the next meeting was always set at each meeting. Most of the members of the ECG were also operational -- Claude Brett has only ten staff inclusive of office staff -- so he was also operating in two capacities. Claude Brett says that if he can't accommodate his 911 it gets transferred to his backup system which is in Kingston -- but he could not contact them. So Bell Canada -- through the Toronto contact (see above) -- contacted the OPP and the OPP came to see Claude Brett and the transfer was made through OPP resources.

Claude Brett had one contact with the OPP -- and that was for the purpose of transferring the 911 calls. The OPP also lost their power on Friday morning. Claude Brett had access to a cell phone but it did not work.

Claude Brett went out and got his officers -- brought them back to the station and re-deployed them. He positioned one officer at the intersection and set out a perimeter for each officer/car on the basis of his previous experience deploying 30-70 officers on the Metro Toronto Police Force.

Claude Brett worked closely with Bell Canada, with Granite Power and the Board of Works (Gary Clark).

Claude Brett says "my place, and staff, worked well." His staff actually enjoyed the ice storm event, it was exciting dealing with 3000 calls per day. "My staff worked well. They all volunteered to come in to work." Claude Brett puts his own staff at the top of the list of what worked well. Coordination between the works department and Parks and Rec. worked extremely well. "The political process worked well as far as the mayor getting on the phone and just hounding the ministry -- political resources -- and saying we need, we need, we need.... The community worked well."

Claude Brett issued press releases and asked volunteers to come to the police station at a certain time when he was doing his door to door checks on Friday. People responded in huge numbers to do the house checks. Claude Brett had 10-30 people show up from an announcement on the radio station. Claude Brett did house checks on Friday, Saturday and Sunday morning -- so that by Sunday morning he had a list of people that he knew he had to check back on.

The shelter worked well. Claude Brett says that they "activated the process" to keep the shelter running.

Auxiliary power did not work well. General resources in town did not work well. CB's staff was not bothered about the use of the police station as a command post -- even though space was tight and resources in the police station were not suited to the challenge (particularly space). The mayor was uncertain about "her role as being in one place and making decisions from that one spot." There was a segment of the town's employees that were uncertain about their role and their responsibilities. Communications were not good between departments. People would not communicate to their subordinates -- pass on information and take suggestions -- and to that extent the communication system within the municipal structure did not work well.

Claude Brett thinks that all staff should have been mobilized and re-deployed where needed, but their was a general lack of familiarity with the plan and with the nature of an emergency response.

Claude Brett observes that decision-making confidence does not come naturally, but can be trained in. Decisions can be made on a short-term basis, all you have to do is focus on what you want for a long term result.

Claude Brett recalls making up lists every day and on an ongoing basis to prioritize his tasks.

CB's biggest problem was the 911 communication system. "And back up power. That haunted me continuously." His generator was barely sufficient to run the communications centre -- no lights or heat in the building.

Claude Brett says that he will ensure he has a link and a backup 911 centre and a backup generator capable of running the entire command post that can run for 24 hours without having to do more than dump fuel into it. Claude Brett says that when he came to Gananoque there was not even a small portable generator.

Claude Brett does not suggest a lot of changes to his own organization, except for communications. He has made a personal commitment to attend all the Brockville meetings on emergency response. (See included report).

A lot of people felt they were left out -- this became obvious to Claude Brett during the post-storm debriefing. Claude Brett says that one person (councilor) felt that Claude Brett should have kept him informed -- but Claude Brett noted that he was not part of the ECG. Claude Brett says "you can't re-write the plan once you're into it." The plan needs to be rewritten. Claude Brett lobbied through his police services board to insist that the town update its plan. Claude Brett says that those with the most criticism of the response have still not read the plan.

Claude Brett has done two of the Arnprior courses in the last ten years (93 & 94) and learned the process of emergency response. Claude Brett notes that in Leeds & Lansdowne the volunteer fire department had a plan but "it didn't say anything about an ice storm" whereas the Arnprior course focuses on the process of response.

Claude Brett drafted all the written press releases on the basis of consultation with the ECG, one in the morning to update the status and one before he went home to update status. Claude Brett could not fax nor did he have time to talk on the phone. The mayor also issued press releases.

Stress: Claude Brett did not find the long hours stressful, but not having his 911 system and losing his communication infrastructure was stressful. Friday morning was stressful because of the combination of rain and thunder and the possibility of a lightning strike following on the experience of commandeering the generator (see above). Claude Brett says he takes the safety of his community "very personally." He takes his responsibilities "very seriously," and he found it stressful not knowing about the condition of the people in his community.

Claude Brett has some stress management training and lots of experience. He managed to work out his own stress by running and exercise. He says that he understood the need of sleep and rest in the emergency. He would light up 8 candles and read a chapter from a book until he drifted off to sleep. He showered at the station -- no water at home -- and lost everything in his freezer because his own power was down for 11 days. Claude Brett observes that everyone is okay when the power is down for everyone, but people start getting cranky when some people have power and others don't. This is a function of fatigue.

By day 8 or 9 Claude Brett managed to get a generator for his own place and activate the well -- he fired up the whole house -- but did not turn on any lights even though he was home with his wife because his neighbors still did not have power. Tempers were starting to fray in the community by day 5 or 6.

CB's wife runs a small service centre on Stone Street North which was only without power for about 8 hours. She was running it 24 hours, it is normally a 12 hour operation. She provided free coffee and as much fuel as she could get. She set up bunks for emergency service workers and her staff -- she was busy. Claude Brett has three boys 20, 14 and 12. The 20-year old had a hard time, because he had nothing to do, and the 12 year old had to be evacuated to Toronto (with the eldest) because he was frightened of the total darkness and silence; "no radio, no television."

Claude Brett says he's "okay" with post-event stress except for the debriefing sessions which he has found very difficult. Claude Brett arranged for an independent facilitator to run the debriefing. Claude Brett says he found it stressful when his people did not return their questionnaires. He says he "blew up" at some council members because of their questions.

Claude Brett acknowledges the uneven distribution of expertise in the smaller communities.

Claude Brett says that on the first day, the first 911 call he received was from some "local personality" that she could not 'get her coffee.' But otherwise he cannot recall any humorous or intriguing incidents.

Claude Brett observes that the ice storm was a "tremendous learning experience as far as what type of people you're dealing with and what type of community you're involved with. I think it's a real test to one's own self and one's fortitude." Claude Brett says he owns property outside of town and will be cleaning up the damage on that property for a few years.

Claude Brett says he worries about people like Gary Clark because they are still dealing with the Ice Storm and will be for years. Claude Brett worries that some of the impetus to address the critical issues will be lost as the ice storm recedes in memory, politicians will drop the ball and there will be pressure to cut corners because of the cost of developing an adequate response.