IceStorm 98 Study

Mayor Bennett began his story with his account of the day before the storm. He had had a Board of Control Meeting at 7:30 on that Wednesday morning and then had to hurry off to a one o'clock meeting in Toronto. He returned from Toronto that night and recalls that the weather was fine as he began the drive home to Kingston. It was when he was near Napanee around 7:00p.m. that he noticed some icy conditions beginning on the 401. Arriving home at around 8:30, he noticed a bit of freezing rain on the car but said it was nothing to be concerned about. He watched the Channel 11 news that night and recalls that there were no particular predictions of "weather catastrophes". He was relieved by this because The National news programme was showing the storm in Montreal and other parts of Quebec and was glad that he didn't have to deal with anything that severe. He went to bed thinking all was well only to be awakened at around 2:00 in the morning by the sound of a tree crashing through the roof of his house, taking out his power lines, television, and telephone lines! As he says, "I suddenly felt very isolated in my own city." He continued to hear trees crashing in his neighbour hood and thought only that "we might have a bit of a problem on our hands." Unable to call anybody, he had no idea the extent of the damage this storm was causing city wide. He and neighbours cleared some debris from their laneways at around 6:30 a.m. in order to move their cars and he proceeded to go to City Hall, which is when he discovered that he couldn't drive down either Brock or Johnson or Albert Streets. He eventually made it to City Hall after an hour by driving down Princess Street.

There weren't many other people there at the time but the phone system was still working. The Chief of Police arrived at around 8:00 a.m. to see Mayor Bennett, followed soon by Gardener Church. At this point they still didn't know the full extent of the situation because it was difficult to contact people due to difficulties with the phone lines and many people just could not get into work. They decided to try to contact everybody and to have a briefing at the Public Utilities Commission on Counter Street. Their initial concern was to keep the emergency routes clear in the city for emergency vehicles, being particularly concerned about access to the hospitals and homes for the aged. This meeting took place at 10:00 a.m. with almost all of the senior management people from the new City of Kingston, including the fire chief, police chief, those responsible for infrastructure and public safety. This was not an emergency control group according to any emergency plan but rather basically a meeting of the key administrative staff of the new city who were able to be contacted "through a variety of creative methods". The CanTel phone system had crashed, the Bell cell system was "starting to hiccough" and they were finding that their ability to communicate was becoming more compromised by the hour so they knew the situation was deteriorating.

At that briefing, Mayor Bennett learned that most of the emergency routes were still blocked and, of course, trees could not simply be plowed out of the way because of the tangles with power lines and the risk of tearing more lines down. The water purification plants were on emergency backup power. The sewage pumping stations "had pretty well all failed" because many did not have back-up power. At this time, it was estimated that 75-80% of the city was without electrical power. They quickly discovered that Kingston General Hospital has two auxiliary back-up systems, while Hotel Dieu Hospital has only one. They also learned that the water purification plants can operate on emergency power to pump water but do not have enough power to actually backwash the filter beds so, once the main power goes down, there are only a certain number of hours that clean water can be guaranteed unless action can be taken quickly to preserve the integrity of the power grid. As Mayor Bennett said, "So we Knew we had a serious situation on our hands."

The utility company estimated that it would be from 3 to 4 days before the whole city had power restored but, over the next 48 hours, they realized how optimistic that statement was because the system continued to literally fall to the ground as the weight of the ice pulled more and more lines down.

Meeting at PUC building on Counter St. at 10:00 am.
At beginning of PUC meeting not all agreed on how serious the situation was, but by the end of one hour and a half, the agreement was that the city was in a state of emergency. Locating the emergency plan for the new (ten-day-old) City of Kingston was not easy, not everyone had a copy yet. Designated EOC's (Emergency Operation Centres) were not usable or accessible, thus City Hall was designated as the EOC by Mayor Bennett. The emergency envisioned in the plan was nothing like what was actually transpiring.

Agreed to meet again at 2:00 pm-- all under instructions to go to respective departments and tackle their responsibilities, under the assumption that power would be out for ten days. Those who attended this first meeting [at PUC building] were the Emergency Control Group. State of emergency declared at noon on Thursday. Trying to inform the Solicitor General of this fact led to the realization that Toronto could call Kingston, but Kingston could not call Toronto. A message was conveyed eventually through the Mississauga O.P.P.. Did not hear from the provincial Emergency Measures Group for three days; they apparently did not realize the crisis extended this far west.

Overall, that first meeting identified and delegated responsibilities and developed the model for all meetings during the storm. As crisis unfolded, new responsibilities and new people were added. "The sheep Rule" was used at meetings: each person at each meeting was asked 1) What happened since we last met? 2) What should have happened? 3) What has to happen between now and the next meeting? in order to assess how each department was dealing with their responsibilities.

Was the question ever raised about your legal capacity to act and who was going to pay the bills?
Mayor announced at beginning of crisis that normal rules and procedures all "went out the window," and no one challenged that decision; everyone agreed that with the seriousness of the situation, this was not the time to bicker over rules of jurisdiction or procedure, Also, he announced that money was not to be a barrier to acquiring any required supplies or assistance. There was no budget and "I have no idea who is going to pay for this," but do and spend whatever is necessary. There are no rules when the lives of the city's residents are at risk.

Everyone worked well together, especially considering that many of them were new to their jobs, and may have just met. No one knew what to expect in terms of group working ability.

Do you think that helped or hindered the situation?
"Probably helped." No preconceptions to influence peoples's ability or willingness to work together. No one felt restricted by rules, "there was an enormous degree of excitement" as well as anxiety and shock. Everyone realized the uniqueness of the situation.

It became clear that we did not have the resources within the community to deal with this crisis. People were working 18 to 20 hours at a time; the Mayor and Mr. Church went the first 40 hours without leaving City Hall. Protocols for handing off responsibilities to someone else were not developed until the fifth or sixth day. One imagines that a crisis is contained and managed from the outside, as with a plane crash--in this case, the people managing were immersed in the crisis, there was no escaping it, and it kept evolving.

Establishing shelters was difficult, and getting people to those shelters was an entirely different problem, especially for the elderly and those needing home medical support. Maintaining power to shelters was a constant concern. All attempts to find solutions were complicated by the inability to find and reach the individuals who might help, such as School Board trustees or janitors with keys to schools. Only one radio station remained operating as a potential way of reaching people, thus the Mayor gave interviews on a regular basis, but it seemed many did not have battery operated radios. Going door to door seemed to be the only option.

If the City of Kingston had still existed as separate municipalities, i.e. with a Mayor and two Reeves trying to deal with the crisis, "that would have really been a recipe for disaster." City Council was not even updated until Sunday night, and they were not part of the decision making process. It was important to have a clear decision-making body, there was not time to consult with anyone.

The power-providing entities (Ontario Hydro, Granite Light and Power, Kingston PUC) were not all involved. Granite simply did not contact City Hall, and still has not. Ontario Hydro was too busy dealing with the situations elsewhere and did not seem to realize the extent of Kingston's crisis. The Mayor finds it difficult to criticize Ontario Hydro, but it placed him in a difficult position at the time, having to answer questions about repairs by saying he simply did not know because, it was difficult communicating with Ontario Hydro .

Re. outside help, who did you talk to? What internal review or write up are you doing?
"It was interesting, the national media was here almost immediately." The CBC, Ottawa stations, Toronto stations. Thus, it was possible to communicate to the rest of the province, if not to the city's own residents. The media from outside the community played a key role in communicating what was going on.

Re. line crews and municipal crews: there is an enormous amount of interaction between utilities throughout the province, thus there were people to talk to about getting help. The city received offers of help from all over, it was almost overwhelming. The province itself (in the form of Emergency Measures Ontario) was playing its coordinating role in this regard in the eastern part of the province, but not here, and the Mayor was not prepared to wait for them to do so. Again rules were out the window, and once again, in discussion with other municipalities concerning help, there was surprisingly never any discussion of who was going to pay. Receiving these resources ended up being a whole other problem of management, i.e. feeding and housing the line crews, coordinating their work. Enthusiasm and excitement were evident amongst those who came to help; they had a sense of this as a " positive human experience."

Only difficulty concerning protocol occurred in dealing with CFB Kingston-- being on a first name basis with the commanding officer, the Mayor called him directly. He said he was happy to help, but that his was a national, not a municipal, force, and that certain channels of communication (through Emergency Measures Ontario and Ottawa) are supposed to be followed when requesting their help. In the end some of this was circumvented. Despite the frustration, the needs of the community were met and the military did a great job. The magnitude of the situation was understood.

Who were the key players initially talked to?
This would be clear in the minutes of the meetings. Initially, it was the administrative figures: Gardiner Church, Jim Keech and Nancy Taylor, Lance Thurston, Cheryl Mastantuano. Really, everybody involved was a key player. What was difficult was the length of the crisis; no one expected to still be there ten days later. Some are still affected by how draining it was. Also important: The Police Chief (perhaps more so than the Fire Chief), Bob Napier for coordinating the mapping of the City for the door-knocking. Everyone was critical in their position.

Coordinating generators was an enormous challenge; the needs of the rural area were in conflict with the urban area. That was an "accelerated crash course" on the diversity and the agricultural needs of the city, and the problems of an urban-ruled city.

What about the voluntary associations in the emergency shelters?
Lance Thurston and Cheryl can help with that subject. Delegating was important in the area. Everything was kept as simple as possible, and emphasis was on providing whatever was necessary, whatever the cost. The chief financial officer only insisted that paper documentation be kept of every purchase made. Volunteer effort was "virtually spontaneous." People just showed up at City Hall looking to help, so it was a good thing City Hall was chosen to be the EOC, rather than the isolated places designated in the official emergency plan.

Re. writing up and evaluating: an attempt is being made to get a cross section of all the various departments and their responsibilities. The documentation is being collected so that an overview can be written, and so that everyone who helped the city in some way can be thanked. A financial report will be included. The emergency planning group of the City of Toronto would like to help us do case a study so that they might learn from the Kingston experience, which was far worse than anything they have ever hypothesized. The City of Toronto's resources were critical to Kingston.

inaudible question re. follow-up
Toronto has been commissioned to do an engineering report on the city to develop a capital plan to minimize future damage, in the event of future storms. A tree inventory has just been done. Now is the time to address the capital side, rather than the social side of the disaster. Lessons learned are going to be incorporated into the new emergency plan. The municipal responsibility is to insure the system does not crash again, but future disasters may be as unexpected and unique as this one was. It has changed this city profoundly.