| Taped Interview Commentary |
| Interviewee: |
Henry Garcia |
| Organization: |
Leeds, Grenville & Lanark District Health Unit |
| Position: |
Director of Health Protection & Infectious Disease Control Services |
| Location: |
458 Laurier Blvd, Brockville, K6V-7A3 |
| Telephone: |
1.613.345.5685 x 2282, Fax: 613.345.7148 |
| Date: |
March 26, 1998 |
| (telephone) Interviewer: |
Craig Jones |
| No. of pages: |
4 |
When did you know something out of the ordinary was happening?
Wednesday, 9:00pm when the trees started coming down (house surrounded by woods).
When and how did you know the nature and scale of the Emergency?
By Thursday night, 24 hours later, reports through press, people calling about power, northern district was without power for two days, asking about timing of emergency measures. First municipality to declare was Lanark Highlands (new township at north end, 11:00am Thursday).
At 0600 radio stations began advising people to stay home, Black & Decker and Dupont advised people not to come in for morning shift.
At 7:00 am HG phoned the director of nursing (who had power) and began talking about closing the office. Advised Doctor Allan to close the office. Word went out to staff to standby but not go to work.
"For the first couple of days we just went day to day."
By Friday morning: staff begin to mobilize, phones still out and begin coordination of services.
1. Find out about planning for first evac centre (Thousands Island Secondary School) which was in the plan. Shelter activated late Thursday, public health nurse and inspector dispatched and assessments begin.
Director of Nursing contacted in Kemptville, ordered to respond to municipal office in Lanark village.
2. Gan declares emerg. Communications between Gan & Brockville down until Saturday morning. HG assumed that the people on site would simply do "what they were trained to do" on the basis of the information they got from the radio. They respond to Gan, Front of Leeds, Rear of Leeds and Front of Prescott. HG learns that they are visiting shelters and supporting councils.
Within five hours 27 municipalities have declared.
HG says that some staff who could not get in touch with anyone drove to HG's house or to Fay Brooks' house to make contact. No one sat around waiting for someone to tell them what to do. One nurse who had recently quit called HG from F of Y to advise that she had visited nursing homes and to report that everything was under control. HG says they had insufficient staff to visit and staff the 40 shelters in his jurisdiction.
THE EMERGENCY PLAN:
"No one opened the plan and we operated which is a good indication" that people knew what they were supposed to do.
Authority:
No staff challenged his authority. HG responsible for inspectors, Fay Brooks managed health inspectors and nurses for the northern sections, and staff that do not normally report to her. Staff that normally do not report to HG did report to HG and "that worked fine." Improvisation was the rule.
Story: "After weeks of devising a list of essential services, it took us less than five minutes to decide which services must be maintained." No time was lost in decision making.
HG spoke with social services and they had the same experience. HG has done a few courses at Arnprior. HG's plan has a family preparedness section so that each staff member has family plans to re-locate, to stock water and so forth. HG does not know if any of his staff utilized their plan.
Shelters did challenge the authority of health inspectors, on the issue of food. Sometimes people like to prepare food at home and bring it to the shelter. HG's inspectors had to triage some food coming from private homes, in the face of criticism from a local radio station.
HG reports one case of suspected food poisoning which he says is pretty good, given the amount of food that was processed and wasted. HG says that some restaurants (gas operated) opened and his inspectors had to ensure that they were not selling rotting meat. Supermarkets had enough power to maintain fridges but not freezers -- inspectors had to service this area too.
Some shelters had never had any contact with health inspectors so there was some tension after a couple of days, particularly as the burnout set in. One inspector was kicked out of a shelter.
Stress:
HG and a couple of his staff were looking for evidence of stress among his staff -- within12 hours they had established schedules, some staff were excused to manage family needs.
Money:
Not much spent. A lot on overtime. No staff protested contract compliance, some volunteered, no pressure from management to control time. An honour system prevailed and seemed to work. Flexibility prevailed. Unions were liberal, there were no complaints even among people who were asked to do things outside of their contract jurisdictions.
Decision-Making:
HG delegated people on one-day only basis, four groups of one nurse and health inspector to ensure shelters are running properly, whether anyone needs special assistance. Some shelters had elderly or frail people, nurses provided medicine. HG asked for help from volunteer agencies and they provided their own staff and nurses. First 24 hours people just did their best because there was no time to strategize. By Friday might things are starting to come together.
What worked well and what didn't?
1. "The potential for human compassion." Lots of demonstration of human skills, which were never tapped in other events. People gave of themselves without complaint.
2. Radio system, Bruce Wiley (CFJR 830) took charge of a lot of things on his own. He ensured that people got what they needed, if he could.
What didn't?
3. Shelter management, the first three or four days, the Legions sell booze and you can't have that in an emergency because it tends to violence and hypothermia. So HG had to prevail on the Legions not to sell booze. Smoking: some shelters were not ready for the task, but it was not well planned: too small, too noisy, no plan for separating the elderly from kids, no room for pets -- that did not work well, but no one died.
Biggest Problem:
Communication -- "our cell phones saved us though all the training stresses not to rely on them."
What would you do differently?
"Go straight to Florida." We'd plan the shelters better and manage them better. Shelters were the hardest things to deal with. HG would also pre-prepare PSA's Public Service Announcements. Have those things ready to go on hard copy, say 10 copies of each.
Contact with Prov EMO & Feds:
The EMO came in late (Monday) but their coordination was good. EMO had the authority to do things that we did not because we did not have a warden. They made it possible for us to get resources from the Canadian Forces. The EMO took over one case of food poisoning.
Media Contact:
HG's people did call-ins and PSAs and it worked fine. Sometimes they would call in and talk about food poisoning or hypothermia and it worked well. This was pure public health and HG and his people were dealing with primary human needs. He had his people contact late term pregnant women -- he had a list of these -- to see how they were doing. They maintained contact with institutions to monitor outbreaks, and control over food and water purity.
Lighthearted Moments:
Evacuating some people from their homes was difficult. One old man simply refused to leave until the inspector offered to hold his hand and lead him out. He was moved to a shelter and he was fine.
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