IceStorm 98 Study

Issue #2 – Assessing the Situation

Responding to an emergency requires knowing what kind of a situation exists. When the circumstances are known, decisions regarding actions, resources and personnel can be made: who needs to be called into work; what supplies and equipment are required; should shelters be set up; will evacuations be necessary; is help from neighboring municipalities required; does the provincial government need to become involved; should an emergency be declared.

During the first few days of the ice storm, assessing what was happening was very difficult, both for those inside the affected area and those outside. For those inside the disaster area, there was little information available. A lack of communication with the outside world and the need to respond quickly meant that local response began in isolation. Reeves and mayors met with key municipal staff to decide how to handle the crisis in their own municipalities. It was not until several days after the worst of the ice storm hit that municipal officials began to know and think about what was happening beyond their own boundaries.

Deciding how to respond became more difficult as time went on. As the ice continued to accumulate, the situation became worse and worse. During the first few days, reconnaissance efforts were hindered by icy roads and weather conditions that precluded helicopter fly-overs. The unprecedented nature of the event prevented even those familiar with other emergencies, from truly understanding the implications of the situation for emergency response. The most crucial information- “When would power be restored?” -was also the most difficult to get. Information from Ontario Hydro was sometimes non-existent and often confusing, particularly at the beginning of the crisis. Hydro’s toll-free information line became known as 1-800-NO RESPONSE.

“Identifying the scope and nature of the emergency was the most difficult [thing].”

Bill Leggett, Principal
Queens University

[The biggest problem was] “not knowing the extent of the damage and the length of time it [power] was going to be out.”

Tom Smith, Ontario Hydro,
Brockville

“I talked to a number of people that… Thursday; they didn’t recognize the damage. Friday they didn’t recognize the extent of the damage… Saturday, same thing… and then when they got right into downtown Kingston… driving around the municipality you really recognized the extent… and I don’t think that anybody probably recognized the extent of the emergency response if they weren’t actually involved in the emergency response…”

Bill Bishop, Commissioner, Human Resources,
City of Kingston

“… in this particular case there was virtually no warning to the event. It wasn’t as though we all sat around waiting for generators to arrive before the first bit of ice hit our community. I mean, all the weather reports and all the indications suggested we were going to be fine, it wasn’t an issue, that it would miss us. In fact, that evening, Wednesday night I sat there watching The National and looking at the situation in Montreal and just counting my blessings that our community wasn’t having to cope with that, and kind of thinking ‘Gee, I wonder if there isn’t anything we as a municipality or as a province can be doing to kind of assist our municipal colleagues in Quebec’ ... three hours later, I had a tree stuck in my roof.”

From the interviews with Gary Bennett,
Mayor of City of Kingston

Some organizations were slower to ask for or accept help than they should have been, in hindsight. Electrical utility crews are used to dealing with emergencies and generally handle them on their own. For Nancy Taylor, Operations Manager for Utilities Kingston, the biggest problem was “accepting the fact that it was more than we could handle ourselves. And asking for help.”

Outside the affected area, the response was often “What ice storm?” and “It can’t be that bad.” Persuading others that this was not an ordinary ice storm or an ordinary situation required some convincing.

“Being farther away in Toronto, they didn’t realize – they couldn’t believe that this was possibly happening”.

Tom Smith, Ontario Hydro,
Brockville

“It was difficult for people who didn’t live through it to really understand.”

Brian Ward,
Ministry of Environment

The fact that it was a weekend two days after the worst of the storm, also slowed response from outside the disaster area. It was not until the Monday or Tuesday following the major power outages that occurred the previous Thursday (January 8th) that assistance started to become fully mobilized.

“In Guelph [at OMAFRA’s Head Office] the enormity of the disaster became evident on Monday January 12th."

John Finlay,
Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs

“EMO did not have a complete feel for the total impact of the storm from January 7th – 11th. Throughout the disaster it was difficult to track the precise situation throughout eastern Ontario from Toronto. Only someone there could be sure of the local situation.”

Joe Scanlon,
Ottawa-Carleton and the 1998 Ice Storm: Sharing the Lessons Learned, Draft Report, pg. 27

The media and politicians played a crucial role in getting information out to places where the storm had not hit. A barrage of media coverage was generated when Prime Minister Chretien visited Wolfe Island with federal several cabinet ministers. Provincial politicians were also visible in the disaster area throughout the emergency.

“Having our [OMAFRA’s] Minister on television at a farm with the Premier and other high-ranking ministers was a boost and got the message through outside the area.”

John Finlay,
Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Rural Affairs