IceStorm 98 Study

Issue #5 – Responders

The pervasive and long-lasting nature of the Ice Storm emergency taxed people’s ability to cope. Individual, private, and public resources were stressed and massive amounts of outside aid were required. “The nature of the emergency was such that it affected everyone and many who could have helped were in crisis themselves. Some simply could not cope and got out of town.” (Marvin Valensky, MCSS). For others, it was a very exciting experience and many people rose to the challenge before them, taking on far more responsibility than their jobs demanded.

The key to providing a successful response was making sure the right person was doing the right job, and having enough people and supplies. A massive operational response was called for, not a high tech or technical response and not a policy and process driven response. Responders needed to be adaptable, able to work in teams, and have the ability to make decisions. “The value of generic, multi-skilled knowledge workers was demonstrated by the Ice Storm.”

Wayne Barnett,
Administrator, Kingston Psychiatric Hospital

Knowledge of the local area and knowing where to locate resources also proved to be a valuable skill for responders. “It was one of those situations where I found myself a couple of people who knew where things were in Kingston, and I latched onto them and basically said ‘you’re mine.’ … I don’t need a whole lot of high-level commanders. What I need is a couple of Radar O’Reillys. They don’t have to be in charge of anything. But you need the people who know where the resources are. They’re the ones who really come in handy.”

From the interview with Scott Cowden, Toronto Fire Service, City of Toronto

Fortunately, there was little trauma during the emergency and little need for critical incident response teams. But many workers became fatigued, and were still feeling the effects of coping with the ice storm many months afterwards. This fatigue factor should be recognized by employers and work practices adjusted accordingly.

Another issue that should not be ignored is that of compensation for workers, both staff and volunteers. Compensation tended to be very uneven, with electrical workers receiving overtime pay and some other employees receiving nothing beyond a regular day’s wages, despite working very long hours. In some cases, volunteer firefighters were paid but other volunteers, such as those who operated the shelters, were given no compensation at all. Municipalities and other organizations should be aware of this issue and attempt to resolve any lingering feelings of resentment, to ensure that staff and volunteers will be willing to give as generously of their time during the next emergency.

One complication was that responders in many areas had to leave their homes and families in the midst of the emergency and give priority to the needs of others.

Local Responders vs. Outside Responders

Because the ice storm was so geographically widespread, most of the responders in eastern Ontario understood the nature of the emergency and could act appropriately. Even if they were not in a severely damaged area, they had a basic understanding of what it was like elsewhere.

In contrast, those outside the affected area were slow to grasp even that there was an emergency, to say nothing of the nature of it and what responses were appropriate. This explains in part why offices located in Toronto were slow to act, and when they did act, why they tried to follow the normal rules for a storm that broke all the rules.

All Canadians have a familiarity with winter emergencies if only on a small scale. Neighbours help neighbours and strangers help one another, if only by pushing a car out of a snow bank or shovelling a driveway. Similarly winter snow and ice storms occur frequently enough that local bodies such as fire, police, public works, and schools have some experience and capacity to deal with them.

During the 1998 Ice Storm, an enormous amount of work was done by individuals: -removing branches, checking on neighbours, and volunteering at local shelters. At another level, local organizations were effective because they were basically operational. Their normal responsibilities were delivering services to the community and its citizens. They know the area, and their organization is what is known in administrative terms as “flat”, (i.e., there were few layers of organization between the front line worker and the ultimate decision maker). Their style was entrepreneurial, to find a solution, rather than bureaucratic (i.e., to develop policies and rules and ensure conformity). Central offices are accused of trying to follow standard procedures and wanted to direct and approve. Micro-management was not the appropriate style in the circumstances.

This was also true of those provincial and federal services that responded most effectively: -MNR, MTO, OMAFRA, and the military. All were more results than process oriented even though they are part of a larger bureaucracy.

It should be noted that politicians do not figure in the story. Except for municipal politicians, elected representatives largely stayed out of the response, leaving decisions to staff. Visits by the Prime Minister, the Premier, and various ministers heightened awareness of the ice storm emergency, but were only made after the response had been underway for several days. The MP’s and MPP’s who were contacted stated that they kept themselves informed but almost consciously kept out of the way.